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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900095-CA 
v. i 
ROBERT P. HAGEN, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of distribution of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal that requires consideration is 
whether the trial court applied the proper burden of proof and 
standard of proof in determining that defendant was not an Indian 
for purposes of state jurisdiction. 
Because this presents a question of law, a "correction 
of error" standard of review applies. City of Monticello v. 
Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990); Provo City 
Corporation v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Relevant text of statutory provisions pertinent to the 
resolution of the issue presented on appeal is contained in the 
body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Robert P. Hagen, was charged with 
distribution of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, 
under Utah Code Ann- § 58-37-8 (1990) (R. 1). 
Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pled guilty to 
the charge (R. 33, 36-43) • Prior to sentencing, defendant filed 
a motion to arrest judgment and to withdraw his guilty plea, 
challenging the court's jurisdiction on the basis that he was an 
Indian who had allegedly committed a crime in Indian country and 
thus was subject to federal jurisdiction only (R. 53-58). After 
an evidentiary hearing, the court denied defendant's motion, 
sentenced him to a term of zero to five years in the Utah State 
Prison, and ordered him to pay various fines and restitution (R. 
61, 63-64; T. 25-26). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The essential facts are not in dispute. Defendant pled 
guilty to distribution of marijuana, which occurred in Myton, 
Utah. 
At the evidentiary hearing on his motion to arrest 
judgment and to withdraw his guilty plea, defendant presented the 
following evidence in an effort to establish that he was an 
Indian for purposes of avoiding state criminal jurisdiction: (1) 
that defendant had lived on Indian reservations all his life, 
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attending their schools and using their hospitals (T. 4); (2) 
that he had lived on the Uintah Indian Reservation for the past 
six or seven years, attending some of the Ute Tribe's business 
meetings and nearly all of their pow wows (T. 5-6); (3) that 
although he is not a member of the Ute Tribe, he is a member of 
the Little Shell Tribe of Chippewa Indians, a tribe which is not 
recognized by the federal government (T. 7; Def. Ex. 3 & 4); (4) 
that he had received money distributed from a fund administered 
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)— a fund that had been 
created pursuant to a money judgment won by various bands of the 
Pembina Chippewa Indians (T. 6-8; Def. Ex. 2); (5) that he had 
received free health care from the Indian Health Services (IHS) 
his entire life (T. 10); and (5) that he had 5/16ths Indian blood 
(T. 11). 
In a brief cross-examination of defendantf the State 
established that defendant had no Ute Indian blood; that his 
mother, although an Widian, was not an enrolled member of any 
tribe; that his father was not an Indian; that he had a 
grandmother who was Indian and a grandfather who was half-Indian; 
and that he received no benefits in Utah other than the free 
health care from IHS (T. 11-13). The State presented no 
independent evidence. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
If the Utah Supreme Court rules that Myton, Utah is not 
within the Uintah Indian Reservation in State v. Perankf Case No. 
Defendant qualified this by indicating that he was receiving 
money from BIA every year (T. 13). 
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860196, defendant's conviction should be affirmed, because there 
would be no doubt that the state had criminal jurisdiction over 
defendant• 
Alternatively, the trial court applied an incorrect 
burden of proof and standard of proof in ruling that defendant 
was not an Indian for purposes of criminal jurisdiction in state 
court. Therefore, the case should be remanded to the lower court 
for determination of that issue under the correct burden and 
standard of proof* 
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT 
In the trial court the State argued as one alternative 
that Myton, Utah is not within the exterior boundaries of the 
Uintah Indian Reservation (T. 18). In ruling that it had 
jurisdiction over defendant, the trial court did not address that 
question, basing its decision solely on its determination that 
defendant was not an Indian (T. 25). In Ute Indian Tribe v. 
State of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 479 
U.S. 994 (1986), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
Myton was within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has that issue pending before it 
in State v. Perank, Case No. 860196. If that court decides that 
Myton is not within the reservation, there would be no question 
the trial court had criminal jurisdiction over defendant. See 
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973); 
United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 459 (7th Cir.) (state 
court has jurisdiction to punish an Indian who commits a crime 
off the reservation and within state territory), cert, denied. 
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469 U.S. 864 (1984). On the other hand, if the Supreme Court 
agrees with the Tenth Circuit, the issue of defendant's Indian 
status would remain. 
Because this issue regarding the boundaries of the 
reservation and their relationship to Myton is before the Supreme 
Court in Perank, the State will not present any argument on the 
issue to this Court. However, since the decision in Perank has 
the potential of mooting the jurisdictional issue, it may be wise 
for the Court to wait for that decision before issuing an opinion 
in the instant case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED AN INCORRECT BURDEN 
OF PROOF AND AN INCORRECT STANDARD OF PROOF 
IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT AN INDIAN 
AND THEREFORE SUBJECT TO STATE JURISDICTION; 
ACCORDINGLY, THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR 
A DETERMINATION OF THIS FACTUAL QUESTION 
UNDER THE CORRECT BURDEN AND STANDARD OF 
PROOF. 
In ruling that defendant was not an Indian so as to 
subject him to the criminal jurisdiction of the state, the trial 
court required defendant to demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence that he was an Indian, in that he was not an enrolled 
member of a federally recognized tribe (T. 25-26). In short, the 
court placed the ultimate burden of proof on defendant and 
required him to meet a clear and convincing standard of proof. 
On appeal, defendant argues that this was reversible error• 
Before addressing the issue of what burden and standard 
of proof should apply to the Indian status determination, a brief 
discussion of criminal jurisdiction in cases involving Indians 
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and Indian lands will be helpful in understanding the 
significance of that issue. 
Criminal jurisdiction over Indian land is controlled by 
a complicated scheme of laws that creates jurisdiction in three 
competing sovereigns: the federal government, the states, and the 
tribes. See generally Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian 
Lands: A Journey Through A Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 
503 (1976) (hereafter "Clinton"). "Determining which sovereign 
or sovereigns have jurisdiction turns on a two-step inquiry: 1) 
where the offense took place; and 2) whether the defendant or 
victim was Indian or non-Indian." St. Cloud v. United States, 
702 F. Supp. 1456, 1458 (D.S.D. 1988). In the instant case, the 
central question is whether defendant is an Indian, such that the 
state court would not have jurisdiction over him for the drug 
2 
crime he allegedly committed in Indian country. If defendant is 
an Indian, the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction to 
prosecute him for the alleged drug offense. See United States 
As noted above, whether Myton, Utah is in Indian country is an 
issue currently pending in the Utah Supreme Court. The trial 
court necessarily assumed that Myton was in Indian country when 
it decided the question of defendant's Indian status. For 
purposes of discussion of the Indian status issue, the State will 
assume that defendant was in Indian country when he committed his 
crime. However, if the Supreme Court in Perank rules that Myton 
is not in Indian country, that defendant may be an Indian will be 
irrelevant; as previously observed, state jurisdiction would lie 
in that situation (i.e., the state has jurisdiction where an 
Indian commits a crime off the reservation and in state 
territory). 
Defendant argues that jurisdiction for his alleged crime is in 
either federal court or tribal court. However, in light of Duro 
v. Reina, 110 S.'Ct. 2053 (1990), the Ute Tribal Court has no 
jurisdiction over him, in that he is not a member of the Ute 
Tribe. (continued on next page) 
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v. Bluef 722 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1983) (federal district court has 
jurisdiction over Indian defendant accused of distribution of 
marijuana and possession with intent to distribute hashish, in 
violation of federal statute); People v. Luna, 683 P.2d 362 
(Colo. App. 1984) (state lacked jurisdiction to prosecute Indian 
defendants for alleged sale and distribution of controlled 
substances in Indian country). See also State v. St. Francis, 
563 A.2d 249, 251 (Vt. 1989) ("If defendants are 'Indians' and 
the crimes were committed in 'Indian country,' then Vermont has 
no jurisdiction over defendants."); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1152, 
1153, 1162. 
With the foregoing principles of jurisdiction as a 
backdrop, the specific issue of what burden and standard of proof 
apply in establishing Indian status may now be addressed. In its 
brief to the Utah Supreme Court in Perank, the State took the 
following position regarding the burden to demonstrate Indian 
status: 
As the moving party challenging the 
court's jurisdiction, Perank carries the 
initial burden of producing sufficient 
evidence, beyond mere suppositions or 
allegations, to establish a jurisdictional 
question. Yeazell v. Copins, 98 Ariz. 109, 
402 P.2d 541, 546 (1965), and United States 
v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir. 1983). 
Moreover, since the basis of his 
jurisdictional challenge is that he is an 
Indian, he carries the initial burden of 
Cont. Under federal law, states may assume jurisdiction 
over Indian lands with the consent of the Indian tribes. See 25 
U.S.C. §§ 1321(a), 1322(a). Although Utah statutory law provides 
for the assumption of jurisdiction, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-36-9 
to -21 (1989), no Indian tribe has consented to state 
jurisdiction. United States v. Felter, 752 P.2d 1505, 1508 n.7 
(10th Cir. 1985). 
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producing prima facie evidence to establish 
such. United States v. Hesterf supra. Given 
the evidence Perank presented, albeit 
limited, we cannot say that he failed to meet 
his threshold burden of establishing his 
status as an Indian and creating a 
jurisdictional question on that issue. 
Once that threshold showing was made, the 
burden shifted, and the State was required to 
carry the ultimate burden of persuasion on 
jurisdiction. State v. Allen, 607 P.2d 426, 
428 (Idaho 1980); Frankel v. Wyllie and 
Thornhill, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 730, 735 (N.D. 
Va. 1982). Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-
1-501(3) provides that "The existence of 
jurisdiction . . . shall be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence." While the 
State argued that Perank was not an Indian 
because he was not an enrolled member of the 
Tribe and had not participated in tribal 
activities (R. 87-88), unfortunately, no 
evidence was presented below by the State 
regarding Perankfs Indian status. 
Given the state of the record, it cannot 
be said that Perank's status as an Indicin 
under 18 U.S.C. Sections 1152 and 1153 was 
not established. 
Brief of Resp. at 48-49 (footnote omitted). In light of the 
position taken there, the State is not free to argue in the 
instant case that the trial court's allocation of the ultimate 
burden of proof to defendant or its application of the clear and 
convincing standard of proof was correct. Although a number of 
courts have adopted a contrary view of which party carries the 
ultimate burden of proof, see, e.g., State v. Francis, 563 A.2d 
at 253 (the defendant bears the burden of proving Indian status 
by a preponderance of the evidence); Jones v. State, 94 Nev. 679, 
680, 585 P.2d 1340, 1341 (1978) ("the accused must shoulder the 
burden of establishing his Indian ancestry if he seeks to 
challenge state court jurisdiction"), the State's position in 
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"Though there are a variety of statutory definitions of 
'Indian', Congress has not defined 'Indian' as used in the 
statutes governing criminal jurisdiction." St. Cloud v. United 
States, 702 F. Supp. at 1460 (footnote omitted). See also 
Clinton at 513. This has required courts to develop a 
methodology for resolving Indian status disputes in criminal 
cases. State v. Bonaparte/ 114 Idaho 577, 578-79, 759 P.2d 83, 
84-85 (Idaho App. 1988). A widely accepted methodology is the 
following: 
Two elements must be satisfied before it can 
be found that [a defendant] is an Indian 
under federal law. Initially, it must appear 
that he has a significant percentage of 
Indian blood. Secondly, the [defendant] must 
be recognized as an Indian either by the 
federal government or by some tribe or 
society of Indians. 
Goforth v. State, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okl. Cr. 1982). Similar 
expressions of this two-prong test appear in United States v. 
Torres, 733 F.2d at 456; United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 
1260, (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 859 (1979); United 
States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 786 (8th Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 
429 U.S. 1099 (1977); State v. Atteberry, 110 Ariz. 354, 519 P.2d 
53 (1974); Makah Indian Tribe v. Clallam County, 73 Wash.2d 677, 
440 P.2d 442 (1968)5. Compare Clinton at 513-20 (suggesting that 
social recognition be added to tribal or federal recognition). 
The Goforth test, with the addition of the social recognition 
Some courts have modified the first prong of the test set out 
in Goforth to require a showing of "some Indian blood" rather 
than "a significant percentage of Indian blood." See, e.g., St. 
Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1460. However, the latter test, as to 
which the parties in the instant case do not disagree, is the 
more appropraite test. 
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 r eiauiiment in a tribe; 2) government 
recognition formally and informally through 
providing the person assistance reserved only 
to Indians; 3) enjoying benefits of tribal 
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enrollment in a federally recognized tribe alone may be 
sufficient proof that a person is an Indian, a person may still 
be an Indian though not enrolled in a recognized tribe. Ibid, 
(citing cases). See also Vialpando, 640 P.2d at 79. 
Although the foregoing list of factors is not 
exhaustive, it will provide the trial court with some guidance on 
remand. 
CONCLUSION 
If the Utah Supreme Court rules that Myton, Utah is not 
within the Uintah Indian Reservation in State v. Perank, this 
Court should affirm defendant's conviction on the ground there is 
no question the state had jurisdiction. Alternatively, the Court 
should remand the case for a determination of the Indian status 
question under a correct allocation of the burden of proof and a 
proper standard of proof. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /O ^day of August, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON [/ 
Assistant Attorney General 
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